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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
DON ENOCH PETERSON 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030704-CA 
INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to the State's argument, this Court should reverse the denial of the 
Appellant's motion to dismiss because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt, via direct or circumstantial evidence, that the Appellant possessed the requisite 
intent to be convicted of a Class A Misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
109(3)(a). 
ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (2002) Creates Three Mental States of 
Which Intentional Child Abuse is the Highest, Thus the State Did Not 
Present a Prima Facie Case Because They Did Not Present Believable 
Evidence of Such Quality and Quantity to Prove That the Result of 
Appellant's Act Was Intentional. 
M[A] motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the state's case may be 
denied //the trial court finds that the State has established a 'prima facie case against the 
appellant' by producing believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged" 
State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5,H 29, 84 P.3d 1183, 1190 (emphasis added). Though the 
threshold is high on a criminal defendant in challenging the sufficiency of evidence, "it is 
not impossible." State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136110. This Court has held that it 
"will not make speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence." Id. "Every element of the 
crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. To affirm the jury's verdict, 
we must be sure the State has introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of 
the charged crime." Id. (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
The Appellant never refutes that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to 
support a conviction. Appellant's Brief at 15. However, it is well settled law in Utah, 
that the evidence must still be of "such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in 
determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added). See also State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 127 (Utah 
1986). Thus, in order for the State to present a prima facie case of Class A Misdemeanor 
Child Abuse under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109, it must present believable evidence of 
such quality and quantity to prove: (1) that the Appellant inflicted a physical injury, with; 
(2) the specific intent to inflict the resulting physical injury; (3) on a child under the age 
of eighteen years. The State did not meet this standard. 
The State is not merely required to show that Mr. Peterson intended his actions, 
but also for Class A Misdemeanor Child Abuse, which has the highest mental state and 
gravest consequences, the State is required to prove that he intended the resulting 
physical injury. 
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The great weight of evidence in the record supports the opposite inference, that is, 
that Mr. Peterson did not intend the resulting injury. For instance, although Mr. Peterson 
did acknowledge that he "lost it" and that he had an anger problem, his frank admission 
did not rise to the level of believable evidence of such quality and quantity to prove that 
he intended to injure his son. R.78. He also testified that he didn't mean to hurt his son, 
that he was very sorry that he injured his son, that he merely intended to stop his two-
year-old son from running outside on his own, and that he lost control of the resulting 
consequence of his actions. R. 68-88. Moreover, there was evidence that Mr. Peterson 
had never inflicted injury on his child before or after this incident. R. 46. 
The State misstates the evidence in the record, when it claims that the jury was 
presented evidence to convict Mr. Peterson of intentionally grabbing his son "by the 
throat and carr[ying] or drag[ging] the two-year-old back to his chair causing the 
injuries." State's Brief 11. The only evidence in the record regarding the child being 
"dragged or carried" is from Mr. Peterson and he testified: "The picking up issue is not 
an issue. His feet never left the ground. I grabbed him by the body, right by the side of 
the arms and led him to the table." R. 75. 
"[T]he prosecution must introduce evidence sufficient to eliminate all reasonable 
doubt of the individual's innocence from the mind of the jurors." State v. Lamm , 606 
P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1980)(dissent). The prosecution did not present evidence to support 
the proposition that the Mr. Peterson intentionally grabbed his son by the throat and then 
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"dragged or carried" the child. In fact, the only evidence the State presented to prove 
intent of injury was circumstantial and is also refuted in the record. R 70-78. 
1. The State Only Presented Circumstantial Evidence to Show Intent and Thus 
Must Show by a Preponderance of Evidence that Such Evidence is 
Incompatible. Upon Any Reasonable Hypothesis, with the Innocence of the 
Accused, and Incapable of Explanation Upon Any Reasonable Hypothesis Other 
than the Defendant's Guilt: The State Failed to Meet this Standard. 
It is also well-settled that when "relying exclusively on circumstantial evidence to 
prove an element of the crime the rule of law applied by this jurisdiction is: 
Circumstantial evidence may be quite as conclusive as direct evidence, but it is 
incumbent upon the prosecution, not only to show by a preponderance of 
evidence.. . that the alleged facts and circumstances are true, but they must also be 
facts and circumstances as are incompatible, upon any reasonable hypothesis, with 
the innocence of the accused, and incapable of explanation upon any reasonable 
hypothesis other than the defendant's guilt. 
Lamm, 606 P.2d at 233 (dissent)(quoting People v. Scott, 37 P. 335, 336 (Utah 1894). 
See also State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 786-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)( this Court 
articulates that when the State relies solely on circumstantial evidence to prove an 
element of a crime, [w]e thus review the evidence to determine whether it excludes all 
reasonable hypotheses of [defendant's] guilt."); State v. Schad, 470 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 
1970) ("It is true, as the defendant contends, that where a conviction is based on 
circumstantial evidence, the evidence should be looked upon with caution, and that it 
must exclude every reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the defendant."). 
The State did not present evidence from an expert or otherwise that the resulting 
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injury on two-year-old Matthew was inflicted in a certain manner. R. 35-126. The State 
did not present evidence, from a police interview or otherwise (no interview was ever 
conducted), from the two-year-old Matthew, that his father was angry with him and 
intentionally hurt him. R. 35-126. In fact, evidence that the State presented did not even 
conflict with Mr. Peterson's account of what happened. The State presented testimony 
from an estranged spouse who did not witness the incident, who did not report the 
incident to the police, and who married the Appellant fourteen days after the incident. R. 
35-47. 
The State presented evidence from a responding Officer, Officer Woffinden, who 
testified to noticing "some reddening on both sides of [Matthew's] neck," that in his 
opinion those marks are consistent with being "grabbed there," that Mr. Peterson 
admitted to losing it and having an anger problem. R. 47-53. None of this testimony 
conflicts with Mr. Peterson's testimony of the incident, that is, that he intended to grab 
his son by his side, but his hands accidentally slipped to his son's neck while he was 
intending to stop his two-year-old child from running outside on his own. R. 68-88. 
Furthermore, Officer Woffinden testified that Matthew "appeared to be in good 
physical condition," that as he woke up he "started to get a little more playful," that [h]e 
did not complain at all," and that "he did not really speak at all." R. 55-56. Significantly, 
while the State tries to imply that Mr. Peterson's admission to "losing it" was an 
admission to losing his temper, at no other time has he injured his son in a like manner. 
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R. 46. Mr. Peterson's admission of having an anger problem, rather than being an 
admission of losing control, is more of an illustration of his taking control of a situation 
through the proper channels, that is, anger management courses. Quite simply, the State 
did not show by a preponderance of evidence that the circumstantial evidence presented 
was incompatible, upon any reasonably hypothesis with the innocence of Mr. Peterson, 
and incapable of explanation beyond Mr. Peterson's guilt. 
2. The Cases on Which the State Relies to Show that the Jury Properly Inferred 
Intent are Distinguishable. 
The State argues that the jury properly inferred intent through the evidence 
presented in this case. However, this Court has held that "before we can uphold a 
conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of 
the crime as charged from which the [factfinder] may base its conclusion of guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. In addition, a guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on 
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." Spanish 
Forkv. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 f 5 (Citations omitted)(modifications). 
The State first relies on State v. Peterson, 453 P.2d 696 (Utah 1969). It is 
important to note that the defendant in Peterson, argued that the statute required the State 
to prove intent to inflict "great" bodily harm, while the relevant statute merely required 
intent to inflict bodily harm. The Utah Supreme Court did not require proof of specific 
intent because "[t]he essence of the offense here involved is an assault upon another with 
a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm; and no particular degree of harm is 
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specified or required." Peterson, 453 P.2d at 697 (emphasis added). However, in our 
case, the statute specifically sets forth three levels of intent, thus the State must prove the 
specific intent included in the statute. Furthermore, the Court specifically points out in 
Peterson, that the defendant's "version does not establish the fact [contra intent to inflict 
bodily harm], nor does it even necessarily raise sufficient doubt to vitiate conviction." 
Id. In Peterson, the defendant cut the hand of another with a hunting knife but claimed 
he was intending to merely threaten the victim rather than injure him. The Court stated 
"It seems almost too obvious for comment that intent to do bodily harm could reasonably 
be inferred from the 'slashing' at another person with a hunting knife." Id. It is not as 
obvious to infer intent to harm in our case, where a father, trying to prevent his two-year-
old child from running outside alone, grabs him and accidentally harms him in the 
process. It is not the same thing as waving a hunting knife at someone. 
The State next relies on State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982). The 
question of intent in Maestas is not relevant to our case. In Maestas, the defendant was 
arguing that the crime of attempted first degree murder required a "stronger showing of 
intent than does the crime of murder itself." Maestas, 652 P.2d at 904. The holding in 
Maestas is merely that Utah law "only requires the kind of culpability otherwise required 
for the commission of the [completed] offense." Id. If the State relies on circumstantial 
evidence to prove intent, it must still prove the required level of culpability set out in the 
statute and still meet the rigors of Utah law. 
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In Maestas, the defendant was in a vehicle being pursued by law enforcement 
agents in connection with a robbery. The State proved intent through the presentment of 
a revolver, a photograph, and testimony by various eyewitnesses. A police officer 
testified that he found the weapon in the defendant's possession. The victim testified 
that he heard the gunshot and saw the defendant looking at him. Moreover, the victim is 
a firearms instructor and had expert knowledge that made him capable of determining the 
direction in which a projectile was traveling from its sound. Another police officer, 
behind the vehicle in which the defendant was located, heard the shot. He also possessed 
knowledge, making him capable of determining the direction a projectile is traveling. He 
heard the shot come from the left front section of the van while the van simultaneously 
veered to the left and he witnessed the defendant bring his hand back into the van after 
the shot.. Finally, one officer in pursuit of the vehicle observed the defendant stick his 
head out of the vehicle with a revolver and turn in the direction of the victim and fire one 
shot. Id. Thus, inference of intent was based on believable direct and circumstantial 
evidence of such quality and quantity to prove intent, unlike the small amount of 
circumstantial evidence in our case. 
The State uses State v. James, 891 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991) to argue that injuries 
sustained by the victim can show intent. Again, Mr. Peterson concedes that 
circumstantial evidence can be used to prove intent, however, that evidence must still be 
believable and of such quality and quantity to prove intent. The evidence presented in 
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James to show intent far outweighs the evidence presented in our case. The defendant in 
James was convicted of first degree murder for killing his infant son. His son was found 
bound in a weighted mattress cover in a marsh. In James, the Supreme Court of Utah 
held that the nature of injury leading to death and relative level of carelessness can be 
inferred in "these types of cases," that is cases where the State must prove "the cause of 
death was by criminal means, not by accident." Id. at 790. Intent is a much harder 
element to prove when the victim is dead. 
The evidence presented in James was the victim's mother testified that the 
defendant had harmed the infant on several occasions before the death, defendant was 
jealous of the infant getting so much attention from the mother, the defendant was 
stressed over finances to care for the infant, the defendant got angry with the victim's 
mother when she helped with the criminal investigation, the defendant had used drugs. 
Id. at 785. Witnesses testified that the defendant seemed nervous during the relevant 
time frame, that the defendant did not ask for help from a uniformed officer when he 
claimed his child was kidnaped from his vehicle. The physical evidence found with the 
victim was connected to the defendant. The defendant had just been to the area where 
the victim was found the day prior to the disappearance. Id. at 793. 
The extensive evidence of prior injuries to the victim inflicted by the defendant 
was an important factor in that case. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court specifically points 
to the evidence of prior injuries to the infant caused by the defendant and states: "[i]n 
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cases of child abuse, such as the one before us, evidence of specific instances of 
defendant's treatment of the child is relevant to establish not merely a general disposition 
for violence of ill-will towards all children, but to establish a specific pattern of behavior 
by defendant toward ...the victim." Id. at 792. The weight and quality of the evidence in 
James is not comparable to the evidence in our case. Specifically, there is no proof that 
Mr. Peterson ever harmed his son before this incident. 
The State then claims that in State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, "a more factually 
similar case," the court found intent from injuries. State's Brief at 9. Widdison is not 
factually similar to our case, indeed it is remote. Furthermore, the evidence presented in 
Widdison was overwhelming and not even comparable to the evidence presented in our 
case. In Widdison, evidence was presented that the victim suffered a history of abuse 
from the defendant, of which she sustained extensive bruises all over her body, lack of 
proper medical attention, several broken bones, injuries to her nose, chin and inside of 
her mouth, the skin connecting her ear to her scalp was ripped, and a diaper rash so 
severe it resulted in ulcerated skin before she suffered death. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, % 
22. Several witnesses testified of the defendant's mistreatment of all of her children, 
including the victim. Id. at f^ 24. In James, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that 
intent can be inferred from prior abuse to children. James, 819 P.2d at 792. That history 
of abuse is clear in the record in Widdison. It is absent in our case. 
Instead the circumstantial evidence presented in our case to show intent is more 
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similar to the quality and quantity of evidence presented in State v. Gonzalez, 2000 UT 
App 136. In Gonzalez, the defendant was convicted of tampering with evidence in a case 
where the defendant was riding in a vehicle with a person who shot a gun into another 
vehicle. The State charged the defendant with tampering with evidence because the 
defendant had an ammunition clip in his possession and admitted to being the owner of 
some marijuana found under the seat in the vehicle. The State's claim was that by the 
defendant possessing the clip, he must have helped conceal the gun and because the 
defendant's marijuana was under the car seat, he must have hid it there. This Court held 
that the mere fact the defendant had an ammunition clip in his possession does not 
support the inference that he tampered with evidence by helping the shooter conceal the 
weapon after the incident. This Court stated, "it is just as possible, absent any evidence 
presented by the State, that [defendant] had the clip in his pocket all evening. Thus, by 
merely establishing defendant's possession of the extra clip, the State did not present 
sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer timing, concealment, and intent to 
conceal the gun beyond a reasonable doubt." Gonzalez, 2000 UT App 136, \ 18. 
This Court further held that just because the defendant admitted to owning the 
marijuana and the fact that the marijuana was found under a seat, does not prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant "hid the marijuana believing an investigation was 
going to occur and in order to impede the investigation." Id. at f^ 20. The defendant was 
clearly involved in wrongdoing, but the State has the burden to prove each element of the 
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particular crime charged. Likewise, in our case, there is evidence that Mr. Peterson 
injured his son, he admits to that fact, and that his son was under eighteen years. There is 
also the likely explanation, especially considering Mr. Peterson never harmed his son 
before, that he accidentally injured his two-year-old son while preventing him from 
going outside alone. There is not evidence of such quality and quantity to prove that Mr. 
Peterson intended to injure his son. The only evidence presented to prove that he 
intended to injure his son was his admission that he "lost it" and that he had anger 
problems. However, Mr. Peterson also admitted to attending anger management classes, 
which show the proper control of the situation. This Court has stated that it will not 
make "speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence." Id. at Tf 20. The State did not 
show that Mr. Peterson had the necessary intent to convict him under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-109. 
CONCLUSION 
The State did not meet its burden to prove that Mr. Peterson intended to injure his 
son. While circumstantial evidence can be conclusive, it must still be believable 
evidence of such quality and quantity to prove the element of the crime. The State did 
not prove intent as required for Class A Misdemeanor Child Abuse as Required by Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-109. Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully request this 
Court to reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. 
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